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Abstract
Class-conditional generative models are an increasingly popular approach to
achieve robust classification. They are a natural choice to solve discriminative tasks
in a robust manner as they jointly optimize for predictive performance and accurate
modeling of the input distribution. In this work, we investigate robust classification
with likelihood-based conditional generative models from a theoretical and prac-
tical perspective. Our theoretical result reveals that it is impossible to guarantee
detectability of adversarial examples even for near-optimal generative classifiers.
Experimentally, we show that naively trained conditional generative models have
poor discriminative performance, making them unsuitable for classification. This
is related to overlooked issues with training conditional generative models and we
show methods to improve performance. Finally, we analyze the robustness of our
proposed conditional generative models on MNIST and CIFAR10. While we are
able to train robust models for MNIST, robustness completely breaks down on
CIFAR10. This lack of robustness is related to various undesirable model properties
maximum likelihood fails to penalize. Our results indicate that likelihood may
fundamentally be at odds with robust classification on challenging problems.
1 Introduction
Figure 1: Linear interpolations of inputs and respective outputs of a conditional generative model
between two MNIST and CIFAR10 images from different classes. X-axis is interpolation steps and
Y-axis negative log-likelihood in bits/dim (higher is more likely under model). MNIST interpolated
images are far less likely than real images, whereas for CIFAR10 the opposite is observed, making it
trivial to fool the CIFAR density model with out-of-distribution samples.
Adversarial attacks are a prime example of un-intuitive deep network failures and mitigating them
is an active research area [Szegedy et al., 2013, Goodfellow et al., 2014c, Akhtar and Mian, 2018].
Conditional generative models have been proposed recently in various works as a way to overcome
this problem [Schott et al., 2019, Ghosh et al., 2019, Song et al., 2018, Li et al., 2018, Frosst et al.,
2018]. These models are an appealing approach for robustness against adversarial attacks for various
reasons. First, by modelling the input density they should be able to detect out of distribution
adversarial inputs. Second, unlike discriminative models that can ignore class-irrelevant information,
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conditional generative models cannot discard any information in the input, which potentially makes
attacking them harder.
Given these properties, we first answer the question: Can we theoretically guarantee that a good
conditional generative model is robust to adversarial attacks? In section 3 we show that even
near-perfect conditional generative models can be fooled.
In section 4 we discuss the basis to empirically verify these robustness claims in practice. We identify
several fundamental issues regarding the maximum likelihood objective for training conditional
generative models and in section 5 we discuss various approaches to improve the training of these
models.
In section 6 we evaluate the ability of the conditional generative models we train to detect adversarial
attacks, even when the attacker tries to fool the detector as well. We find that even when models
have good likelihoods and reasonable accuracy, problems arise in the way the model captures class
information. Most strikingly these problems are not reflected by the commonly-used likelihood
metric, leading to non-robust classification. These results may have wide-reaching implications, as it
has been shown that robustness and generalization are closely related [Miyato et al., 2018].
Our contributions:
• Our theoretical analysis reveals that near-perfect conditional generative models can still
be confidently fooled. This result makes it impossible to guarantee robust detection of
adversarial examples with conditional generative models.
• We identify various overlooked issues with training conditional generative models in practice
and explore various solutions.
• Attacking the resulting models shows that while our proposed models defeat strong attacks
on MNIST, they completely fail to robustly detect adversarial examples on CIFAR10.
• Analyzing the models reveals how maximum likelihood training leads to various undesirable
properties, which can hamper the model’s ability to detect adversarial examples.
2 Robust Classification with Generative Models
We present a brief overview of flow-based deep generative models, conditional generative models,
and their applications to adversarial example detection.
2.1 Flow based generative models
Flow based generative models [Rezende and Mohamed, 2015, Dinh et al., 2015, 2017, Kingma and
Dhariwal, 2018] compute exact densities for complex distributions using the change of variable
formula. They achieve strong empirical results [Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018] and the closed form
likelihood makes them easier to analyze than the closely related VAE [Kingma et al., 2014]. The
main idea behind flow-based generative models is to model the data distribution using a series of
bijective mappings zN = f(x) = fN ◦ fN−1... ◦ f1(x) where zN has a known simple distribution,
e.g. Gaussian, and all fi are parametric functions for which the determinant of the Jacobian can
be computed efficiently. Using the change of variable formula we have log(p(x)) = log(p(zN )) +∑N
i=1 log(|det(Ji(zi))|) where Ji is the Jacobian of fi and zi−1 = fi−1... ◦ f1(x).
The standard way to parameterize such functions fi is by splitting the input zi−1 into two zi−1 =
(z1i−1, z
2
i−1) and chose
fi
([
z1i−1
z2i−1
])
=
[
z1i−1
s(z1i−1) z2i−1 + t(z1i−1)
]
(1)
which is invertible as long as s(z1i−1)j = sj 6= 0 and we have log(|det(Ji(zi−1))|) =
∑
j log(|sj |).
For images the splitting is normally done in the channel dimension. These models are then trained by
maximizing the empirical log likelihood (MLE).
A straightforward way to turn this generative model into a conditional generative model is to make
p(zN ) a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) with one Gaussian per class, i.e. p(zN |y) = N (µy,Σy).
Assuming p(y) is known, then maximizing log(p(x, y)) is equivalent to maximizing log(p(x|y)) =
2
log(p(zN |y)) +
∑N
i=1 log(|det(Ji(zi))|). At inference time, one can classify by simply using Bayes
rule. Note that directly optimizing log(p(x|y)) results in poor classification accuracy as discussed in
section 4. This issue was also addressed in the recent hybrid model work [Nalisnick et al., 2019].
2.2 Related Work
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [Akhtar and Mian, 2018], and
while many attempts have been made to train robust models or detect malicious attacks, significant
progress towards truly robust models has been made only on MNIST [Schott et al., 2019, Madry et al.,
2017]. Even CIFAR10 remains far from being solved from a standpoint of adversarial robustness.
One common belief is that adversarial attacks succeed by moving the data points off the data manifold,
and therefore can possibly be detected by a generative model which should assign them low likelihood
values. Although this view has been challenged in Gilmer et al. [Gilmer et al., 2018], we later discuss
how their setting needs to be extended to fully study robustness guarantees of conditional generative
models.
Recent work [Song et al., 2018, Frosst et al., 2018, Li et al., 2018] showed that a generative model
can detect and defend adversarial attacks. However, there is a caveat when evaluating detectability of
adversarial attacks: the attacker needs to be able to attack the detection algorithm as well. Not doing
so has been shown to lead to drastically false robustness claims [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. In [Li
et al., 2018] the authors report difficulties training a high accuracy conditional generative model on
CIFAR10, and resort to evaluation on a 2-class classification problem derived from CIFAR10. While
they do show robustness similar to our Carlini-Wagner results, they do not apply the boundary attack
which we found to break our models on CIFAR10. This highlights the need to utilize a diverse set of
attacks. In [Schott et al., 2019] a generative model was used not just for adversarial detection but
also robust classification on MNIST, leading to state-of-the-art robust classification accuracy. The
method was only shown to work on MNIST, and is very slow at inference time. However, overall
it provides an existence proof that conditional generative models can be very robust in practice. In
[Ghosh et al., 2019] the authors also use generative models for detection and classification but only
show results with the relatively weak FGSM attack, and on simple datasets. As we see in Fig. 1 and
discuss in section 6, generative models trained on MNIST can display very different behavior than
similar models trained on more challenging data like CIFAR10. This shows how success on MNIST
may often not translate to success on other datasets.
3 Robust Detection Cannot be Guaranteed
In this section we discuss the possibility of guaranteeing robustness via conditional generative models.
In the previous adversarial spheres work [Gilmer et al., 2018] the authors showed that a model can be
fooled without changing the ground-truth probability of the attacked datapoint. This was claimed to
show that adversarial examples can lie on the data manifold and therefore cannot be detected.
While [Gilmer et al., 2018] is an important work for understanding adversarial attacks, it has several
limitations with regard to conditional generative models. First, just because the attack does not
change the ground-truth likelihood, does not mean the model can not detect the attack. Since the
adversary needs to move the input to a location where the model is incorrect, the question arises:
what kind of mistake will the model make? If the model wrongfully gives low likelihood to the correct
class without wrongfully increasing the likelihood of the other classes then the adversarial attack
will be detected, as the joint likelihood over all classes moves below the threshold of typical inputs.
Second, on the adversarial spheres dataset [Gilmer et al., 2018] the classes support does not overlap.
If we were to train a conditional generative model pθ(x, y) (which does not have 100% test accuracy)
then the KL divergence KL (p(x, y)||pθ(x, y)), where p(x, y) is the data density, is infinite due to
division by zero (note that KL (pθ(x, y)||p(x, y)) is what is minimized with maximum likelihood).
This poses the question, whether small KL (p(x, y)||pθ(x, y)) or small Shannon-Jensen diver-
gence is sufficient to guarantee robustness. In the following, we show that this condition is insufficient.
The intuition why conditional generative models should be robust is as follows: If we have a good
discriminative model then the set of confident mistakes, i.e. where the adversarial attacks must
reside, has low likelihood but might be large in volume. For a conditional generative model, the set
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Figure 2: Counter example construction. Shown on the left are the two class data densities, on the
right the Bayes-optimal classifier for this problem (assuming λ1 > λ2) and the model we consider.
Despite being almost optimal, the model can be fooled with undetectable adversarial examples (red
arrows). Detailed description in section 3.
of undetectable adversarial attacks, i.e. high-density high-confidence mistakes, has to be small in
volume. Since the adversary has to be ∆ close to this small volume set, the idea is that if we add
some smoothness conditions that exclude pathological cases, e.g. a zero measure dense set like the
rationals, the ∆ area around this small volume set should still be small. This is where the idea breaks
down due to the curse of dimensionality. Expanding a set by a small radius can lead to a much larger
one even with smoothness assumptions. Based on this insight we build an analytic counter-example
for which we can prove that even if
KL (q||p) <  KL (p||q) <  (2)
where p = p(x, y) is the data distribution, and q = q(x, y) is the model. We can show that with
probability ≈ 0.5 one can take a correctly classified input sampled from p, and perturb it by at most
∆ to an adversarial example that is classified incorrectly and is not detectable.
We note that the probability in every ball with radius ∆ can be made as small as desired, excluding
degenerate cases. We also assume that the Bayes optimal classifier is confident and is not affected by
the attack, i.e. we do not change the underlying class but wrongfully flip the decision of the classifier.
The counter-example goes as follows: Let U(a, b) be the density for a uniform distribution on an
annulus in dimension d, {x ∈ Rd : a ≤ ||x|| ≤ b} then the data conditional distribution is
p(x|0) = λ1U(0, 1) + (1− λ1)U(1, 1 + ∆) 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1 (3)
p(x|1) = λ2U(0, 1) + (1− λ2)U(2, 3) 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1
with p(y = 0) = p(y = 1) = 1/2. Both classes are a mixture of two distributions, uniform on the
unit sphere and uniform on an annulus, as shown in Fig. 2. The model distribution is the following:
q(x|0) = U(0, 1 + ∆) (4)
q(x|1) = λ2U(0, 1) + (1− λ2)U(2, 3)
i.e. for y = 1 the model is perfect, while for y = 0 we replace the mixture with uniform
distribution over the whole domain. If λ1  λ2 then points in the sphere with radius 1 should
be classified as class y = 0 with high likelihood. If λ2 >> 1(1+∆)d then the model classifies
points in the unit sphere incorrectly with high likelihood. Finally if 1 >> λ1 then almost half
the data points will fall in the annulus between 1 and 1 + ∆ and can be adversarially attacked
with distance lesser or equal to ∆ by moving them into the unit sphere as seen in Fig. 2.
We also note that these attacks cannot be detected as the model likelihood only increases. In
high dimensions, almost all the volume of a sphere is in the outer shell, and this can be used
to show that in high enough dimensions we can get the condition in Eq. 2 for any value of 
and ∆ (and also the confidence of the mistakes δ). The detailed proof is in the supplementary material.
This counter-example shows that even under very strong conditions, a good conditional generative
model can be attacked, so no theoretical guarantees can be given in the general case for these models.
Our construction, however, does not depend on the learning model but on the data geometry. This
raises interesting questions concerning the source of the susceptibility to attacks: Is it the model or an
inherent issue with the data?
4 Issues with Maximum Likelihood
4.1 The Difficulty in Training Conditional Generative Models
Most recent publications on likelihood-based generative models primarily focus on quantitative
results of unconditonal density estimation [van den Oord et al., 2016, Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018,
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Salimans et al., 2017, Kingma et al., 2016, Papamakarios et al., 2017]. For conditional density
estimation, either only qualitative samples are shown [Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018], or it is reported
that conditional density estimation does not lead to better likelihoods than unconditional density
estimation. In fact, it has been reported that conditional density estimation can lead to worse data
likelihoods [Papamakarios et al., 2017, Salimans et al., 2017], which is surprising at first, as extra
bits of important information are provided to the model.
One way to understand this seemingly contradictory relationship is when considering our objective.
When we train a generative model with maximum likelihood (either exactly or through a lower bound)
we are maximizing the empirical approximation of Ex,y∼P [log(Pθ(x, y))] which is equivalent to
minimizing KL(P (x, y)||Pθ(x, y)). Consider now an image x with a discrete label y, which we are
trying to model using Pθ(x, y). The NLL objective is:
E(x,y)∼P [− log(Pθ(x, y))] = Ex∼P [− log(Pθ(x))]
+ Ex∼P [Ey[− log(Pθ(y|x))|x]] (5)
If we model Pθ(y|x) as uniform we get that the second term is log(C) where C is the number of
classes. This value is negligible compared to the first term Ex∼P [− log(Pθ(x))], i.e. the “penalty"
for completely ignoring class information is negligible, so it is not surprising that these models can
produce non-discriminative results. What makes matters even worse is that the penalty for confident
mis-classification can be unbounded. It can also explain why the conditional ELBO is comparable
to the unconditional ELBO [Papamakarios et al., 2017]. Another way to see this is by thinking
of the likelihood as the best lossless compression. When trying to encode an image, the benefit
of the label is at most log(C) bits which is small compared to the whole image. While these few
bits are important for users, from a likelihood perspective the difference between the correct p(y|x)
and a uniform distribution is negligible. This means that when naively training a class-conditional
generative model by minimizing E(x,y)∼P [− log(Pθ(x|y))], typically discriminative performance as
a classifier is very poor.
4.2 Outlier Detection
Another issue arises when models trained with maximum likelihood are used for detection of outliers.
The problem is that maximum likelihood, which is equivalent to minimizing KL(P (x, y)||Pθ(x, y)),
is known to have a “mode-covering” behavior. It has been shown recently in [Nalisnick et al., 2019]
that generative models, trained using maximum likelihood, can be quite bad at detecting out-of-
distribution example. In fact it has been shown that these models can give higher likelihood values, on
average, to datasets different from the test dataset corresponding to the training data. In section 6.3 we
show even more puzzling results, where we find that the interpolation of two images can be confidently
detected as an outlier on one dataset, but is impossible to detect on another dataset. In section 6.4 we
further show that even if the model classifies correctly, i.e. ∀j 6= yi : pθ(x|y = yi) > pθ(x|y = j),
then pθ(x|y = j) for a wrong class is still high enough to not be considered an outlier. We conclude
that likelihood as an evaluation metric and training objective has serious flaws when it comes to
outlier and adversarial detection, and even a model with good likelihood and accuracy can still exhibit
many undesirable properties. The problem is that current models outputting exact or approximate
density are mainly trained with maximum likelihood while models that train with other objectives,
such as GANs [Goodfellow et al., 2014a, Arjovsky et al., 2017], do not output calibrated scores and
cannot help with outlier or adversarial detection.
5 Training Conditional Generative Models
We will now describe some of the various approaches we investigated in order to train the best
possible flow-based conditional generative models, to achieve a better trade-off betwen classification
accuracy and data-likelihood as compared to commonly-used approaches. We also discuss some
failed approaches in the appendix.
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5.1 Reweighting
The most basic approach, which has been used before in various works, is to reweight the discrimi-
native part in eq. (5). While this can produce good accuracy, it can have an unfavorable trade-off
with the NLL where good accuracy comes with severely sub-optimal NLL. This tradeoff has also
been shown in [Nalisnick et al., 2019] where they train a somewhat similar model but classify with a
generalized linear model instead of a Gaussian mixture model.
5.2 Architecture change
Padding channels has been shown to increase accuracy in invertible networks [Jacobsen et al., 2018,
Behrmann et al., 2019]. This helps ameliorate a basic limitation in bijective mappings (see Eq. (1)),
by allowing to increase the number of channels as a pre-processing step. Unlike the discriminative
i-RevNet, we cannot just pad zeros as that would not be a continuous density. Instead we pad channels
with uniform(0,1) random noise. In effect we do not model MNIST and CIFAR10 as is typically
done in the literature, but rather the zero-padded version of those. While the ground-truth likelihoods
for the padded and un-padded datapoints are the same due to independence of the uniform noise and
unit density of the noise, this is not guaranteed to be captured by the model, making likelihoods very
similar but not exactly comparable with the literature. This is not an issue for us, as we only compare
models on the padded datasets.
5.3 Split prior
One reason MLE is bad at capturing the label is because a small number of dimensions have a
small effect on the NLL. Fortunately, we can use this property to our advantage. As the contribution
of the conditional class information is negligible for the data log likelihood, we choose to model
it in its distinct subspace, as proposed by [Jacobsen et al., 2019]. Thus, we partition the hidden
dimensions z = (zs, zn) and only try to enforce the low-dimensional zs to be the logits. This has
two advantages: 1) we do not enforce class-conditional dimensions to be factorial; and 2) we can
explicitly up-weight the loss on this subspace and treat it as standard logits of a discriminative model.
A similar approach is also used by semi-supervised VAEs [Kingma et al., 2014]. This lets us jointly
optimize the data log-likelihood alongside a classification objective without requiring most of the
dimensions to be discriminative. Using the factorization p(zs, zn|y) = p(zs|y) ·p(zn|zs, y) we model
p(zs|y) as Gaussian with class conditional mean ei = (0, ..., 0, 1, ...0) and covariance matrix scaled
by a constant. The distribution p(zn|zs, y) is modeled as a Gaussian where the mean and variances
are a function of y and zn.
6 Experiments
6.1 Training Conditional Generative Models
In this section, we investigate the ability to train a conditional generative model with good likelihood
and accuracy simultaneously using a version of the state-of-the-art flow model GLOW [Kingma and
Dhariwal, 2018] on MNIST and CIFAR10. All our models use zero padding as discussed in section
5.3, which we found to improve classification performance. The increase was partially due to the
change in architecture possible only due to padding which makes direct comparison problematic.
Model details are in the supplementary material. We compare three settings: 1) A class-conditional
mixture of 10 Gaussians (Base). 2) A class-conditional mixture of 10 Gaussians with an upweighted
p(y|x) term (Reweighted). 3) Our proposed conditional split prior (Split). Results can be found in
table 1.
MNIST Base Reweight Split CIFAR10 Base Reweight Split
% Acc 96.9 99.0 99.3 % Acc 56.8 83.2 84.0
bits/dim2 0.95 1.10 1.00 bits/dim 3.47 3.54 3.53
Table 1: Comparison between different models.
2As we model zero padded datasets as described in section 5.3, these numbers are not exactly comparable
with the literature.
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As we can see, especially on CIFAR10, pushing up the accuracy to values that are still far from state-
of-the-art already results in non-negligible deterioration to the likelihood values. This exemplifies
how good accuracy without harming likelihood estimation is still a challenging problem. We note
that while the difference between the split prior and re-weighted version is not huge, the split prior
does offer better NLL and better accuracy in both experiments.
6.2 Adversarial attacks
We first evaluate the ability of conditional generative models to detect standard attacks, and then try
to detect attacks designed to fool the detector. We evalulate both the gradient based Carlini-Wagner
L2 attack (CW-L2) [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b] and the gradient free boundary attack [Brendel et al.,
2018]. Results are shown in table 2 on the left. It is interesting to observe the disparity between the
CW-L2 attack, which is easily detectable, and the boundary attack which is much harder to detect.
Attacking Classification Classification and Detection
MNIST Reweight Split Reweight Split
CW − L2 0% (100%) 1% (100%) 17% (100%) 14% (100%)
Boundary attack 43% (82%) 36% (80%) 0% (0%) 0% (0%)
CIFAR10
CW − L2 0% (97%) 0% (0%) 6% (99%) 3% (100%)
Boundary attack 67% (100%) 72% (100%) 100% (100%) 100% (100%)
Table 2: Comparison of attack detection. Percentage of successful and undetected attacks within
L2-distance of  = 1.5 for MNIST and  = 33/255 for CIFAR10 for proposed models. Number in
parentheses is percentage of attacks that successfully fool the classifier, both detected and undetected.
Next we modify our attacks to try to fool the detector as well. With the CW-L2 attack we follow
the modification suggested in [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a] and add an extra loss term `det(x′) =
max{0,− log(p(x′))− T} where T is the detection threshold. For the boundary attack we turn the
C-way classification into a C + 1-way classification by adding another class which is “non-image”
and classify any image above the detection threshold as such. We then use a targeted attack to try
to fool the network to classify the image into a specific original class. This simple modification to
the boundary attack will typically fail because it cannot initialize. The standard attack starts from a
random image and all random images are easily detected as “non-image” and therefore do not have
the right target class. To address this we start from a randomly chosen image from the target class,
ensuring the original image is detected as a real image from the desired class.
From table 2 (right side) we can see that even after the modification CW-L2 still struggles to fool the
detector. The boundary attack, however, succeeds completely on CIFAR10 and fails completely on
MNIST, even when it managed to sometimes fool the detector without directly trying. We hypothesize
that this is because the area between two images of separate classes, where the boundary attack needs
to pass through, is correctly detected as out of distribution only for MNIST and not CIFAR10. We
explore this further below.
6.3 Image Interpolation
To understand why the learned networks are easily attacked on CIFAR but not on MNIST with the
modified boundary attack, we explore the probability density of interpolations between two real
images, as the boundary attack roughly proceeds along the line between the attacked image and
the initial image. The minimum we would expect from a decent generative model is to detect the
intermediate middle images as “non-image” with low likelihood. If this was the case and each class
was a disconnected high likelihood region, the boundary attack would have a hard time when starting
from a different class image.
Given images x0 and x1 from separate classes y0 and y1 and for α ∈ [0, 1] we generate an intermediate
image xα = α · x1 + (1− α)x0, and run the model on various α values to see the model prediction
along the line. For endpoints we sample real images that are classified correctly and are above the
detection threshold used previously. See Fig. 1 for interpolation examples from MNIST and CIFAR.
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(a) Log-likelihood of interpolations on MNIST (b) Log-likelihood of interpolations on CIFAR10
(c) Class probability of interpolations on MNIST (d) Class probability of interpolations on CIFAR10
Figure 3: Average Log likelihoods and class probabilities for interpolations between data points from
different classes, x-axis is interpolation coefficient α. The MNIST model behaves as desired and
robustly detects interpolated images. The CIFAR10 model, however, fails strikingly and interpolatd
images are consistently more likely than true data under the model.
In figure 3 (a) we see the average results for MNIST for 1487 randomly selected pairs. As expected,
the likelihood goes down as αmoves away from the real images x0 and x1. We also see the probability
of both classes drop rapidly as the network predictions become less confident on the intermediate
images. Sampling 100 α values uniformly in the range [0, 1] we can also investigate how many of the
interpolations all stay above the detection threshold, i.e. all intermediate images are considered real
by the model, and find that this happens only in 0.5% of the cases.
On CIFAR images, using 1179 pairs, we get a very different picture (see fig. 3 (b)). Not only does the
intermediate likelihood not drop down, it is even higher on average than on the real images albeit to a
small degree. In classification we also see a very smooth transition between classes, unlike the sharp
drop in the MNIST experiment. Lastly, 100% of the interpolated images lay above the detection
threshold and none are detected as a “non-image” (for reference the detection threshold has 78.6%
recall on real CIFAR10 test images). This shows that even with good likelihood and reasonable
accuracy, the model still “mashes" the classes together, as one can move from one Gaussian to another
without passing through low likelihood regions in-between. It also clarifies why the boundary attack
is so successful on CIFAR but fails completely on MNIST. We note that the basic attack on MNIST
is allowed to pass through these low density areas which is why it sometimes succeeds.
6.4 Wrong Class Outliers
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10
Figure 4: NLL for images conditioned on the correct class vs the highest probability wrong class.
Next we show that even conditional generative models that classify very well do not see images
with the wrong label as outliers. To understand this phenomenon we first note that if we want the
correct class to have a probability of at least 1− δ then it is enough for the corresponding logit to be
larger then all the others by log(C) + log
(
1−δ
δ
)
where C is the number of classes. For C = 10 and
δ = 1e− 5 this is about 6, which is negligible relative to the likelihood of the image, which is in the
scale of thousands. This means that even for a good conditional generative model which confidently
predicts the correct label, the pair {xi, yw 6= yi} (where w is the leading incorrect class) cannot be
detected as an outlier according to the joint distribution, as the gap log(p(xi|yi)) − log(p(xi|yw))
is much smaller than the standard deviation of NLL values. In Fig. 4 we show this by plotting the
histograms of the likelihood conditioned both on the correct class and on the most likely wrong class
over the test set. In other words, in order for log(p(xi|yw)) to be considered an outlier the prediction
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needs to be extremely confident, much more than we expect it to be, considering test classification
error.
7 Conclusion
In this work we explored limitations, both in theory and practice, of using conditional generative
models to detect adversarial attacks. Most practical issues arise due to likelihood, the standard
objective and evaluation metric for generative models by which probabilities can be computed. We
conclude that likelihood-based density modeling and robust classification may fundamentally be
at odds with one another as important aspects of the problem are not captured by this training and
evaluation metric. This has wide-reaching implications for applications like out-of-distribution
detection, adversarial robustness and generalization as well as semi-supervised learning with these
models.
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A Implementation details
We pad MNIST with zeros so both datasets are 32x32 and subtract 0.5 from both datasets to have a
[-0.5,0.5] range. For data augmentation we do pytorch’s random crop with a padding of 4 and ’edge’
padding mode, and random horizontal flip for CIFAR10 only.
The model is based on GLOW with 4 levels, affine coupling layers, 1x1 convolution permutations and
actnorm in a multi-scale architecture. We choose 128 channels and 12 blocks per level for MNIST
and 256 channels and 16 blocks for CIFAR10. In both MNIST and CIFAR10 experiments we double
the number of channels with uniforrm(0,1) noise which we scale down to the range [0, 2/256] (taking
it into account in the Jacobian term). One major difference is that we do the squeeze operation at the
end of each level instead of the beginning, which is what allows us to use 4 levels. This is possible
because with the added channels the number of channels is even and the standard splitting is possible
before the squeeze operation.
The models are optimized using Adam, for 150 epochs. The initial learning rate is 1e− 3, decayed
by a factor of 10 every 60 epochs. For the reweighted optimization the objective is
loss = − log(p(x|y))/D − log(p(y|x)) (6)
where D is the data dimension (3x32x32 for CIFAR, 1x32x32 for MNIST).
For adversarial detection we use a threshold of 1.4 for MNIST (100% of test data are below the
threshold) and 4. for CIFAR10 (78.6% of test images are below the threshold).
B Negative results
In this work explored many ideas in order to achieve better tradeoff between accuracy with little or
no impact.
B.1 Robust priors
Since the Gaussian prior is very sensitive to outliers, one idea was that confident miss-classifications
carry a strong penalty which might result in “messing" all the classes together. A solution would be to
replace the Gaussian with a more robust prior, e.g. Laplace or Cauchy. Another idea we explored is a
mixture of Gaussian and Laplace or Cauchy using the same location parameter. In our experiments
we did not see any significant difference from the Gaussian prior.
B.2 Label Smoothing
Another approach to try to address the same issue is a version of label smoothing. In this new
model the Gaussian clusters are a latent variable that is equal to the real label with probability 1− 
and uniform on the other labels with probability . Using this will bound the error for confident
miss-classification as long as the data is close to one of the Gaussian centers.
B.3 Flow-GAN
As we claimed the main issue is with the MLE objective, it seems like a better objective is to optimize
KL (p(x, y)||pθ(x, y)) or the Jensen-Shannon divergence as this KL term is highly penalized for
miss-classification. It is also more natural when considering robustness against adversarial attacks.
Optimizing this directly is hard, but generative adversarial networks (GANs) [Goodfellow et al.,
2014b] in theory should also optimize this objective. Simply training a GAN would not work as we
are interested in the likelihood value for adversarial detection and GANs only let you sample and
does not give you any information regarding an input image.
Since flow algorithms are bijective, we could combine the two objective as was done in the flow-GAN
paper [Grover et al., 2018]. We trained this approach with various conditional-GAN alternatives and
found it very hard to train. GANs are know to be unstable to train, and combining them with the
unstable flow generator is problematic.
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C Analytical counter example:
Assume p(y = 1) = p(y = 0) = q(y = 1) = q(y = 0) = 1/2 and
p(x|0) = λ1U(0, 1) + (1− λ1)U(1, 1 + ∆) (7)
p(x|1) = λ2U(0, 1) + (1− λ2)U(2, 3) (8)
q(x|0) = U(0, 1 + ∆) (9)
q(x|1) = λ2U(0, 1) + (1− λ2)U(2, 3) (10)
where U(a, b) is the uniform distribution on the annulus Rd(a, b) = {x ∈ Rd : a ≤ ||x|| ≤ b} in
dimension d.
Lemma 1. For ||x|| < 1 we have
p(0|x) = λ1
λ1 + λ2
(11)
q(0|x) = 1
1 + λ2(1 + ∆)d
(12)
Proof. The U(a, b) density (when it isn’t zero) is 1
Cd(bd−ad) where cd is the volume of the d-
dimensional unit ball. The proof follows by a simple use of Bayes rule.
so by having λ1 >> λ2 >> 1(1+∆)d we can have the model switch wrongfully predictions from
y = 0 to y = 1 when we move x from the annulus Rd(1, 1 + ∆) to Rd(0, 1)
Lemma 2. If λ1 > 1(1+∆)d and λ1 < 1− e− then KL(q(x, y)||P (x, y)) ≤ 
Proof. Using the chain rule for KL divergence, KL(P (x, y)||Q(x, y)) = KL(P (y)||Q(y)) +
Ey[KL(P (x|y)||Q(x|y))] we get that KL(q(x, y)||P (x, y)) = KL(q(x|y = 0)||P (x|y = 0)). We
now have
KL(q(x|y = 0)||P (x|y = 0)) =
∫
Rd(0,1)
1
Cd(1 + ∆)d
log
(
1
Cd(1+∆)d
λ1
Cd
)
(13)
+
∫
Rd(1,1+∆)
1
Cd(1 + ∆)d
log
(
1
Cd(1+∆)d
1−λ1
Cd((1+∆)d−1)
)
=
− log(λ1(1 + ∆)d)
(1 + ∆)d
(14)
+
(1 + ∆)d − 1
(1 + ∆)d
log
(
(1 + ∆)d − 1
(1− λ1)(1 + ∆)d
)
≤ log
(
1
1− λ1
)
<  (15)
Lemma 3. If 1 > λ1 > 1(1+∆)d and λ1 <

d log(1+∆) then KL(P (x, y)||q(x, y)) ≤ 
Proof. Again using the KL chain rule we have
KL(P (x|y = 0)||q(x|y = 0)) = λ1
∫
Rd(0,1)
1
Cd
log
(
λ1
Cd
1
Cd(1+∆)d
)
(16)
∫
Rd(1,1+∆)
(1− λ1)
Cd((1 + ∆)d − 1) log
 (1−λ1)Cd((1+∆)d−1)
1
Cd(1+∆)d
 ≤ λ1d log(1 + ∆) <  (17)
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Proposition 1. For all (, δ,∆) there is a distribution p and an approximation q in dimension
d = O˜
(
log( δ1+δ )+log(
1
 )
log(1+∆)
)
such that
KL(q(x, y)||p(x, y)) < , KL(p(x, y)||q(x, y)) <  (18)
but with probability greater then 1/3 over samples x ∼ p there is an adversarial example x¯ satisfying:
1. yq(x) = yp(x) with p(yp(x)|x) and q(yq(x)|x) greater or equal to 1 − δ. The original
point is classifier correctly and confidently.
2. yq(x) 6= y(x¯), yq(x¯) = y(x¯). We change the prediction without changing the ground-truth
label.
3. q(yq(x¯)|x¯) < δ, p(yp(x¯)|x¯) > 1− δ. The classifier is confident in its wrong prediction.
4. ||x− x¯|| < ∆. We make a small change to the inputs.
5. The density q(x¯) is greater or equal to the median density, making the attack undetectable
by observing q(x).
6. For ∆ < 1 the probability in any radius ball can be made as small as desired.
7. The total variation of the distribution can be made as small as desired.
The last two conditions exclude degenerate trivial counter-exmaples, one where the whole distribution
support is in a ∆ radius ball and ∆ does indeed represent a small pertubation. The other condition
excludes “pathological" distributions ,e.g. misclassification on a dense zero measure set like the
rationals.
Proof. In order to satisfy conditions 1-5, using previous lemmas, it is enough that
1. λ1λ1+λ2 ≥ 1− δ
2. 1
1+λ2(1+∆)d
≤ δ
3. λ1 ≤ 1− e−
4. λ1 > 1(1+∆)d
5. λ1 < d log(1+∆)
By setting λ2 = δ1−δλ1 we can easily satisfy condition 1. It is not hard to see that condition 2 is
equivalent to λ1 ≥
(
1−δ
δ
)2 1
(1+∆)d
which superseeds condition 4 when δ < 1/2. Condition 3 can be
satisfied with λ1 < /2 by using 1− x ≥ e−2x for x < 1/2.
This boils down to ensuring d is large enough so that there is a valid λ1 such as(
1− δ
δ
)2
1
(1 + ∆)d
< λ1 <

d log(1 + ∆)
(19)
Which is true for large enough d as the l.h.s decays exponentially while the r.h.s linearly.
Condition 6 is trivial as the radius of the support is fixed so as long as ∆ < 1 the probability in any ∆
radius ball decays exponentially. Regarding total variation, we note that from the divergence theorem
this can be bounded by a term that depends on the surface area of shperes with fixed radius which
decreases to zero as d goes to infinity.
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